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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF ATTACHMENT AND LANGUAGE
IN ANALOGICAL REASONING
by Tamra Elizabeth Beckman
May 2011
The present study examined the relationships between attachment and analogical
reasoning within two domains: social reasoning and physical reasoning. Verbal reasoning
was assessed as a possible mediator of these relationships. This study was conducted with
67 typically-developed children between the ages of nine to 11 years of age who were
recruited from The University of Southern Mississippi‟s student population and from
schools in Hattiesburg, MS and Ocean Springs, MS. Attachment security was assessed
using the Kerns Security Scale (Kerns, Klepac, & Cole, 1996), and verbal reasoning was
assessed with the Weschler Intelligence Scale for Children-3rd edition (Weschler, 1991).
Analogical reasoning within social and physical domains was assessed using analogous
match-to-sample tasks. To assess social reasoning, the participants were required to
reason about others‟ emotions such as happiness, sadness, fear, and anger. To assess
physical reasoning, they were required to reason about physical tasks that others were
engaged in, such as sports, cooking, art, and school activities.
The results revealed that verbal reasoning was significantly related to social
reasoning, while the relationship between verbal reasoning and physical reasoning
approached significance. Attachment was not significantly related to any of the other
variables in this study.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
How do human beings become “mind readers” and seemingly use this ability,
known as theory of mind, to predict what someone is going to do next? Does a poor
attachment style towards a primary caregiver hinder the development of social reasoning
skills, such as an ability to “read minds” or, rather, of more general cognitive abilities?
The present study seeks to address these questions by focusing on a measure of
attachment security and its relationship to analogical reasoning generally, and social
reasoning specifically. Theory of mind, which allows people to understand other
individual‟s beliefs and emotions, has been a widely studied aspect of social reasoning.
The current study will assess the ability to recognize and reason about others‟ emotions;
one critical aspect of the human theory of mind system.
Vygotsky (1978) and later, Tomasello (1999) focus on the complex relationships
between a child‟s social environment and the development of social cognitive skills and
more general cognitive abilities, which open the door to cultural learning, such as
language and social skills. The ability to develop and maintain an advanced culture may
be one key component of human cognition that distinguishes us from all other species
(Tomasello, 1999, 2001). The current study focuses on the particular set of skills that
allows humans to interact with other members of their culture. More specifically, of
interest is whether the benefits of developing a strong attachment to caregivers, an early
social experience, might be limited to facilitating the development of social reasoning,
which encompasses a broad suite of skills – only one facet of which is theory of mind, or
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may have even farther reaching benefits with regards to a broader range of cognitive
abilities, such as analogical reasoning.
These questions have been addressed in the study of children with autism
(Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leekman & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992;
Zaitchik, 1990), but the relationship between attachment and analogical reasoning within
social and physical reasoning domains in typically-developed children has not been
explicitly examined. Furthermore, previous research has suggested intriguing differences
in performance on social and physical reasoning tasks in typically developing children
(Zaitchik, 1990).
There are clear reasons to assume a relationship might exist among attachment,
verbal reasoning, and social/physical reasoning. First of all, attachment may be related to
the development of social reasoning, as children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
are generally impaired in forming attachments to others, and show deficits in reasoning
about the mental states of others (Sobel, Capps, & Gopnik, 2005). Children with this
range of disabilities also show deficits in language skills (Tomasello, 1999). Verbal
reasoning may also be assumed to be related to attachment, as children who are more
securely attached may be more socially engaged, and thus more communicative (more
will be discussed). However, the impairments of children with ASD may also be more
widespread to include general cognitive deficits such as impairments in executive
function and dual representation (Hill, 2004), rather than being restricted to the social
domain (Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996; White & Roberson-Nay, 2009). It is possible that
sharing perspectives with others leads to more widespread facilitative effects in the
development of early cognitive abilities, such as early advances in dual representation,
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analogical reasoning etc., perhaps mediated through advances in language. Understanding
how these complex capacities are related in typically developing children may help
inform where development „fails‟ in disorders such as autism. Prior research has been
mixed with regards to the links between attachment and abilities such as social reasoning
and verbal reasoning, which are indirectly related to our main question of interest, as will
be reviewed below. Thus, there is a need for further investigation.
There are reasons to presume a relationship between attachment and emerging
theory of mind in children whose development is typical in both aspects. By nine months
of age, children have an emerging ability to monitor gaze and to alternate gaze between a
social partner and an object or event, which gives them the opportunity to begin to
understand intentions and share attention with their conspecifics (Adamson & Bakeman,
1985; Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Tomasello, 1999, 2001). These behaviors
and understandings reflect joint attention, which is the first step in the development of
theory of mind. Presumably, typically-developing children are more likely than those
with autism or autistic spectrum disorder to develop secure attachments. In having a
secure attachment, there may be more opportunities to interact with a caregiver, so in
turn, there are more opportunities to develop joint attention skills. van Ijzendoorn et al.
(2007) found that children with autism were more likely to have insecure attachments,
while typically developing children were more likely to have secure attachments. The
authors therefore questioned whether children with autism might have a biological
predisposition for insecure attachment. In other words, children with autism may have a
difficult time developing a secure attachment even if their parents make an attempt at
trying to facilitate its development. Insecure attachments in children with autism may
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cause problems processing social stimuli, which in turn, may cause deficits in joint
attention. But, even within typically developing children, there is a range of both
attachment (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, and Wall, 1978; Blehar, Lieberman, Ainsworth,
1977) and theory of mind development (Hughes, Happe, Taylor, Jaffee, Caspi, & Moffitt,
2005).
Culture places these social cognitive skills of joint attention and theory of mind in
a much broader context, so one should address the importance of culture and how young
generations learn about their culture through a specific set of social-cognitive skills.
Cultural transmission is a recent evolutionary phenomenon that allows organisms to save
time and effort in learning skills and making improvements on already established social
practices because it exploits the existing knowledge and skills of conspecifics
(Tomasello, 1999, 2001). Cultural transmission is evident in the following examples: rat
pups eating only the food their mothers give them, young chimpanzees learning how to
use tools from the adults around them, and human children gaining linguistic skills and
conventions from the adults around them. Unlike other species, humans have a uniquemode of cultural transmission known as cumulative cultural evolution that reflects how
fast human beings accumulate modifications (also known as cultural histories) over time.
For example, the way humans have used hammers has changed dramatically throughout
human history because of all of the modifications and improvements that have been made
in the use of a hammer. Human beings accumulate these modifications because they have
powerful cultural learning processes or skills to support them.
An important and powerful aspect of human cultural learning is social cognition,
which includes the ability of individual organisms to understand conspecifics as beings
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like themselves (Tomasello, 1999). This capacity allows an individual to put themselves
in the “other person‟s shoes,” or take the perspective of another, so they can learn from
the other person as well as through the other person, which is what makes the
transmission of culture so rapid. Moreover, they are able to understand that the other
person has intentions and mental states like their own. Individuals learn about their
culture from others through the process of imitation and active instruction by adults.
First, if an individual is using a hammer, the other person that is observing will need to
understand the situations that a hammer is used in for that particular culture. The
individual observing the use of the hammer will also probably need to understand the
intentions of the person using the hammer such that he or she probably did not intend for
it to be used to kill animals or humans (it is not part of their culture). Imitation is
reflected in the whole process of observing another individual and then replicating that
particular behavior, which is how components of a culture are passed on through
generations.
Unfortunately, those with autism and autistic spectrum disorders are not able to
understand that other people have intentions and mental states like the self (Sobel et al.,
2005; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Specifically, this is reflected in
the fact that they are unlikely to initiate bids for joint attention with others by
declaratively pointing to or showing objects (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Charman et al., 1997;
Mundy & Willoughby, 1996), nor are they likely to respond to others‟ bids for joint
attention (Leekman et al., 1997). Thus, they are also unable to engage in skills of cultural
learning. For instance, they may have difficulty understanding a person‟s intentions when
they are using a hammer or some other object.

6

Development of Cultural Learning Skills
By nine months of age, typically-developing children have an emerging ability to
monitor gaze and to alternate gaze between a social partner and an object or event, which
gives them the opportunity to begin to understand intentions and share attention with
their conspecifics (Adamson & Bakeman, 1985; Carpenter et al., 1998; Tomasello, 1999,
2001). These emerging behaviors and understanding of intentions reflect joint or shared
attention, which is the first step in the development of theory of mind. Joint attention is a
social-cognitive skill that allows people to identify with other humans and to understand
them as intentional agents, like the self, through the use of pre-linguistic communicative
acts to help coordinate attention between a social partner and an object or event. More
specifically, joint attention can be classified as dyadic-between self and other agent-or
triadic-between self, another agent, and an object. Triadic interactions should involve an
early understanding of mental states in order to coordinate attention between self, other,
and the object. Joint attention is used to characterize an entire set of skills, interactions,
and behaviors such as gaze following (flexibly and reliably looking where another person
looks), joint engagement (engaging adults in extended periods of social interaction
mediated by an object), social referencing (using others as reference points in social
interactions), and imitative learning (acting on objects in the ways that others do).
Because most of these joint attentional behaviors emerge simultaneously in development
and rely on the understanding of others as perceiving, behaving, and goal-directed beings,
it strongly suggests that these behaviors are not isolated cognitive modules or learned
behavioral sequences but, rather, reflect the children‟s emerging understanding of other
persons as intentional agents. The emerging understanding of others as intentional agents
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at nine months seems to come from an infant‟s understanding of other persons as “like
me” at an early age, and the fact that children also have new understanding of their own
intentional actions. For example, an infant will begin to see other humans as “like
themselves,” so any new understanding of their own functioning will give them a new
understanding of others‟ functioning as well (Meltzoff, 2007; Tomasello, 1999).
According to Tomasello, “the child simply sees or imagines the goal-state the other
person is intending to achieve in much the same way that she would imagine it for
herself, and she then just sees the other person‟s behavior as directed toward the goal in
much the same way that she sees her own” (1999, p.76).
Other people are a part of a child‟s social environment or human cultural
environment that they grow up in, which sets the stage for their cognitive development
(Tomasello, 1999). The people in the child‟s social environment live in a certain way in
that they may eat a particular set of foods, live in a certain type of living arrangement,
and engage in particular rituals and activities throughout the day. This means that the
child will experience and be exposed to certain languages or environments that range in
degree of stimuation, which in turn affects their cognitive development and how they
interact and learn from others. If they are not exposed to these things, it could be quite
devastating to a child because they need this information to thrive in their cultural
environment. The adult transfers this information or cultural knowledge by either directly
instructing the child or by the process of scaffolding, which is when an adult may witness
a child struggling with a skill and attempt to provide hints or draw attention to aspects of
it that the child may be missing, in order to make the task easier. When a child can solve
a problem with the assistance of an adult, it suggests that the child has skills that are not
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yet matured but are in the process of maturation. Vygotsky (1978, p.86) termed “the
distance between a child‟s actual development level as determined by independent
problem solving and level of potential development as determined through problem
solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers” the zone of
proximal development. In general, the zone of proximal development is indicative of a
child‟s capability to learn under a teacher or parent‟s guidance. The other people in a
child‟s environment, and the child‟s relationships with those others, are thus very
important to a child‟s learning and cognitive development.
The Influence of Social Cognitive Skills on Language Development
If children can take advantage of these social-cognitive skills, such as joint
attention and understanding others as intentional agents, it opens a window for them into
the cultural world which can result in the creation of unique forms of cognitive
representation and theory of mind (Moore & Dunham, 1995; Tomasello, 1999). For
example, children use their cultural learning skills such as joint attention in order to
acquire linguistic and other communicative symbols (Tomasello, 1992, 1999). In order to
acquire these symbols and language in general, a child must first be able to engage in
joint attention. The child must also live in a world that has structured social activities that
are understandable, which aids in the development of language. Routine activities that
take place between two individuals can assist a child in coming to understand and discern
how an object and activity work and function and they can ultimately represent the
actions as intentional and goal-directed. For example, an adult may sit down with a child
and roll a red ball back and forth between her and the child on a regular basis, so
therefore, the child may come to understand her own goal of rolling the ball to the adult
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and the adult‟s goal of rolling the ball back to her. The adult must then use a novel
linguistic symbol that refers to the object they are paying attention to in a way that a child
can understand as relevant to this activity such as a verbalization of the term “pass the
ball.” In order to learn a new word, or phrase, such as “pass the ball,” the child must be
able to use the new word or symbol toward the adult in the same way and purpose in
which the adult used it toward him or her. Over time, children become more skillful at
joint attention and understanding the adult‟s communicative intent in a variety of novel
situations, so they continue to learn new words and build their vocabulary. As studies
show, engagement in joint attention is associated with a larger vocabulary or language
ability (Carpenter et al., 1998; Tomasello & Todd, 1983), although the positive effects of
joint attention on language development decrease after about 15 months of age
(Carpenter et al., 1998).
Joint attention and language are both thought to influence the development of
theory of mind, although there is scant evidence indicating that joint attention is directly
related to theory of mind (Charman et al., 2000; Jenkins & Astington, 1996). Language is
influential in the development of theory of mind because the linguistic symbols that
reflect language allow children to simultaneously perceive one situation in different ways
or to have multiple simultaneous representations of one situation (Tomasello, 1999). For
example, when speaking, the speaker will monitor the listener‟s attentional status, which
means that both persons in the conversation know that there are at least two perspectives
on a situation, as well as others that are symbolized in unused symbols and constructions.
One aspect of theory of mind is being able to understand the perspectives of others.
Furthermore, the fact that language can help an individual discover nonobvious
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commonalities among objects (or inferring hidden sources of similarity among novel
objects) may also allow one to gain insight about human action, which is part of theory of
mind (Baldwin & Saylor, 2005). In essence, language facilitates the abstraction process
necessary in the construction of theory of mind. Parents, for instance, may use mentalistic
terms such as “want” (desire), “gonna” (intention), and “know” (knowledge/belief) across
a variety of contexts. This gives the child the opportunity to learn what the parent means
or what exactly their perspective is on the situation. The speaker, the parent, might ask a
question right before snack time (“What do you want to eat? Banana or cracker?”), which
gives the child the opportunity to understand the parent‟s perspective and what he or she
means by “want” in that situation. In a different context, “want” could mean an entirely
different thing. Mental states such as “want” are unobservable, so we may learn the
meaning of such words by inferring it from the context in which it was said (Miller,
2006). In all, language allows an individual to determine what the intentions and desires
of a person are, which is part of theory of mind. Over time, language promotes the
development of a fully-developed theory of mind ability, which involves being able to
explain and predict the actions of self and others. In addition to this, security of
attachment may be related to the development of joint attention and language
development. Individuals with secure attachments are likely to be more comfortable
seeking out social interactions with others. This gives them more opportunities to engage
in joint attention, which in turn may encourage the development of language because of
the increased opportunities to learn new words and how they are used in different
contexts (Block, 2006).
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Deficits in Social-Cognitive Skills
An inability to develop normal language can be detrimental to the development of
specific social-cognitive skills such as theory of mind, along with more general cognitive
development (Tomasello, 1999; Vygotsky, 1978). Children with selective language
impairment also have trouble with other nonlinguistic cognitive skills such as analogical
reasoning and social cognition. According to Baldwin and Saylor (2005), language is
both related and important to analogical reasoning because it serves as a catalyst for
abstraction. They hypothesized that language allows one to “compare people‟s behaviors
across distinct action scenarios, thereby helping to highlight commonalities, foster
attention to relevant differences and promote inferences about non-obvious sources of
commonality and difference” (p.124). Because language allows one to develop an
understanding of abstract concepts, deficits in language may be detrimental to
performance on analogical reasoning tasks. As for theory of mind, it may not develop
normally in those with language impairments because they are not as skilled at
understanding the communicative intent of others. Moreover, individuals with language
impairments have difficulty forming and understanding abstract concepts, so they will
have a difficult time understanding mental states because they too are abstractions.
As for children with autism, some fail to learn language at all- probably because
they are not able to understand the communicative intent of others. According to
Tomasello (1999) and Jarrold, Boucher, and Smith (1993), those with autism typically
also have trouble with symbolic play and have poor language abilities. Tomasello
suggested that these children‟s difficulty in understanding others as intentional agents
may lead to deficits in their symbolic skills, which in turn may create difficulties in the
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development of theory of mind. Alternatively, it is possible that difficulties in symbolic
skills create difficulties in forming representations of others as intentional agents, not the
other way around. Children with autism tend to approach things in the same way and with
the same perspective time after time. This inflexibility may be due to their inability to
understand the perspectives and intentions of others. One study in particular by Morgan,
Maybery, and Durkin (2003) showed that, in fact, those with autism spectrum disorders
do have difficulty with both their language skills and in engaging in joint attention
behaviors. Thus, the poor development of joint attention behaviors may be related to poor
understanding of others as intentional agents, along with the poor development of
language skills. This research indicates links between language, joint attention, and the
development of abstraction, which could all plausibly relate to theory of mind. These
same components may be linked in typically-developing children as well.
As mentioned above, theory of mind seems to be poorly developed in both those
with autism and those with some language impairments. It seems to be lacking in
nonhuman primates as well, although this has become a contentious issue as of late (Call,
Hare, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2004; Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003,
2004; Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003). Nonhuman
primates are intentional, causal agents, but they may not understand the world in causal
and intentional terms (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 2006). There are several studies
that provide evidence that nonhuman primates do not possess a theory of mind. For
instance, Povinelli, Nelson, and Boysen (1990) and Woodruff and Premack (1979)
showed that nonhuman primates do not bring a knowledge of others‟ intentionality and
causality to their experiments, although after scores of trials they eventually learned to
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respond in a manner that was consistent with being able to do so. There are also social
behaviors that nonhuman primates do not perform, which would indicate that they do not
have a theory of mind. For instance, they do not point to outside objects for others, hold
objects up to show them to others, try to bring others to a location to observe something,
offer objects to others by holding them out, or intentionally teach others new behaviors
(Tomasello et al., 2005). These actions are not engaged in presumably because nonhuman
primates lack an understanding of the conspecific‟s underlying internal mental states that
could be affected and manipulated. However, more recent studies from the same
laboratory and others, have suggested that apes may have an appreciation for some
elements of the theory of mind system such as seeing (Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello,
2000; Hare, Call & Tomasello, 2001, 2006, but see Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Povinelli &
Vonk, 2004). Because theory of mind may be unique to humans, humans are uniquely
able to create and modify unique cognitive products such as math and language –
symbols that can be used to communicate with and instruct others. So, a central question
has been – what is special about human development that allows for the emergence of
this ability?
Authors such as Tomasello (1999) and Vygotsky (1978) have proposed that the
development of joint attention and gaze sharing may be unique to human rearing.
Eventually, theory of mind, or the ability to understand other people‟s intentions,
develops through these sorts of dyadic interactions. Attachment and human rearing may
foster the development of theory of mind. Again, when children are more securely
attached, they may have more opportunities to interact with their caregiver, and thus,
more opportunities to engage in joint attention and gaze sharing. As will be discussed,
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language, specifically as measured in the form of verbal reasoning, may have a role in the
relationship between attachment and reasoning processes.
As mentioned earlier, language is influential to the development of higher
psychological processes, so the absence of human-like language in non-humans may
explain why nonhuman primates are not able to develop a full-blown theory of mind and
make improvements on already established institutions (Vygotsky, 1978). In other words,
they are not able to go beyond their simple tool use and develop a complex culture like
humans can. According to Vygotsky (1978), language has an organizing function that
“penetrates the process of tool use and produces fundamentally new forms of behavior”
(p. 24). When solving problems for instance, a child that can use speech is able to achieve
a much broader range of activity because they can apply as tools objects that are not in
their direct visual field as well as those that are. Speech gives the child the ability to plan
how to solve the problem. For example, they can think about other tools they can get
from other places in order to solve the problem. Whereas children can use speech to plan
how they will solve a problem, apes are not able to use speech and appear to be more
spontaneous and impulsive in solving a problem. Language seems to free the individual
from the direct visual field and to go beyond that. It allows an individual to think
abstractly and to predict if certain objects or behaviors may be useful in the solving of a
problem.
Thus, language may have implications for theory of mind and analogical
reasoning, because both abilities seem to require that one can think in the abstract beyond the immediate experience. Theory of mind, for instance, requires the ability to put
oneself in the other person‟s shoes and to think about what they might do in a particular
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situation. Furthermore, analogical reasoning involves reasoning about relations or the
transfer of information from a known system to a relatively unknown system (Vosniadou,
1995). In other words, an individual applies a known relationship between two things to
a new problem or a new situation. In both situations, language allows someone the ability
to go beyond what is directly visible and to think abstractly. It allows someone the ability
to predict and to think ahead. Attachment, an early social experience, could influence the
development of language, which in turn, could influence both theory of mind and
analogical reasoning. Moreover, attachment could affect development independently of
language ability. There has been a wealth of research investigating how attachment may
bolster the development of theory of mind, but there has been a paucity of research
exploring the relationship between attachment and analogical reasoning. The
hypothesized relationship between attachment and analogical reasoning will be discussed
further below, but it is possible that attachment may also affect the development of
analogical reasoning through language (or attachment may affect the development of
analogical reasoning directly and independently of language). The proposed research
seeks to explore whether or not attachment may bolster the development of analogical
reasoning, regardless of whether the reasoning is within the physical or social domain, or
whether its facilitative effects are limited to within the social domain.
Attachment Theory
In order to appreciate the predicted relationships between a child‟s early
attachment to their primary caregiver and their continuing cognitive development, it is
critical to first review the main theories of attachment. Recent attachment theory seems to
begin with John Bowlby‟s work, which indicates that children need a close and
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continuous relationship with a primary caregiver in order to flourish (Bowlby, 1973;
Feeney & Noller, 1996). For Bowlby, attachment behavior is defined as “any form of
behavior that results in a person attaining or retaining proximity to some other
differentiated and preferred individual, usually conceived as stronger and or/wiser”
(1973, p. 292). Infants engage in specific behaviors such as sucking, clinging, smiling,
and crying that promote protective responses from the adult caregiver, which also
promotes a binding relationship between the infant and the caregiver. According to
Bowlby, the goal of attachment behaviors is to establish and maintain contact with the
attachment figure, while the goal of the attached person is to feel and maintain security.
Bowlby (1973) also discussed how attachment functions to maintain a balance
between exploratory behavior and proximity seeking behavior while considering how
accessible the attachment figure is and the possibility of dangers in the environment. For
example, if an infant feels like separation from their attachment figure is a threat to their
well-being, he or she will try to remain close to that person (a secure base) because that
person is thought to be a safe haven or a source of comfort to the infant. This behavior
suggests that use of the caregiver as a secure base will appear more frequently when the
infant is in a situation of perceived threat such as a stranger getting very close to an
infant. For example, an infant who is wary of a stranger may try to go hug mother and to
get close to her, which should reduce the wariness. According to Bowlby, withdrawal
behaviors from a fear-eliciting stimulus are well-organized by the age of 12 months
because the infant‟s cognitive equipment has developed enough to take into account
relevant objects and situations that are absent and present. If the infant does not feel
threatened, the infant will be likely to engage in exploratory behavior rather than
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attachment behavior towards the caregiver. Exploratory behavior may also be the result
of a secure attachment with the attachment figure who has encouraged the child to be
self-reliant and autonomous, but is also reliably available and accessible when the infant
needs it. In all, Bowlby suggested that proximity seeking, secure base, and safe haven are
the three defining features and functions of an attachment relationship.
Bowlby (1973) addressed individual differences in attachment that are reflected in
some key propositions of attachment theory. The first proposition suggests that a person
will be less prone to fear if an individual is confident in the availability of the attachment
figure when it is desired. The second proposition suggests that confidence, or a lack of it,
in the attachment figure builds up slowly during infancy, childhood, and adolescence. In
addition to this, these expectations about the availability of the attachment figure appear
to remain and persist throughout the rest of one‟s life. The last proposition suggests that
actual expectations that one has about the accessibility and responsiveness of attachment
figures that developed during the younger years are likely to reflect the actual
experiences one had. All of these expectations about the attachment figure are
incorporated into inner working models of attachment. Specifically, a key feature of these
workings models is the attachment figure itself, where they may be found, and how they
may be expected to respond if the infant or child turns to them for support. These
working models are relatively stable over time and reflect memories and beliefs from a
person‟s early experiences of caregiving that continue on into new relationships.
Although Bowlby (1973) discussed individual differences, Ainsworth was the
first to engage in detailed studies of individual differences in attachment styles. These
attachment styles are assessed using the Strange Situation, which is when the mother and
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the infant are placed in an unfamiliar and threatening room (Ainsworth et al., 1978).
After a few minutes, a stranger enters the room and then the mother leaves. Another few
minutes pass, and the mother returns and the stranger leaves. At this point, the mother
makes an attempt to engage the infants with toys and then leaves the infant in the room
alone again. The infants‟ behaviors are observed throughout the entire situation both
when the caregiver and stranger leave and return to the room in order to determine the
infant‟s attachment style. The particular patterns of distress and avoidant behaviors
toward the parental caregiver and the stranger along with more positive behaviors such as
being comforted easily when the parent or caregiver returns are indicative of a specific
attachment style.
Ainsworth conducted naturalistic observations of mother-infant interactions using
the Strange Situation Procedure. Based on these observations, Ainsworth and colleagues
(1978) suggested that organized patterns of infant behavior can be used to identify
different styles of infant-mother attachment. This resulted in three particular styles of
attachment: insecurely attached-avoidant (Group A), securely attached (Group B), and
insecurely attached-resistant or anxious-ambivalent (Group C). A fourth attachment style,
disorganized attachment emerged later. These patterns of behavior are associated with the
amount of interaction between mother and infant and how sensitive and responsive the
mother is to the infant‟s needs. There are particular behaviors associated with each
attachment style. For instance, Group A children tend to be indifferent as evident in their
responses of defensiveness and avoidance of close contact when the mother comes and
goes; Group B children are sociable and exploratory when the mother leaves and happy
to see the mother when she returns; while Group C children respond with anxious
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behaviors such as crying and appear ambivalent towards the mother when she returns
after a brief separation, sometimes displaying anger towards the mother. Children who
evidence disorganized attachment often appear to be contradictory in their actions toward
their attachment figure, and generally appear confused.
There are also associated patterns of caregiving related to each attachment style.
Group A parents tend to be rejecting and rigid and averse to contact or may be overly
intrusive, while Group B parents are likely to be available and responsive. Group C
parents are insensitive and intrusive or inconsistent in their availability and attention.
Children who are classified under disorganized attachment often come from family
environments and parents that are less than ideal and sometimes even abusive or
neglectful, or may have been abused themselves as children.
Although some of the early work on attachment classified children into discrete
categories of attachment styles, later research has developed continuous scales of
attachment such as the Security Scale (Kerns et al., 1996) that is used in the present
study. Thus, rather than classifying children into discrete categories, they are assessed on
their degree of attachment ranging from insecure to secure. Readers further interested in
categorical versus continuous nature of attachment classifications (and the debate
surrounding this issue) should consult Fraley and Spieker (2003) and accompanying
rejoinders by many prominent attachment researchers including J. Cassidy, A. Sroufe, E.
Waters and T.Beauchaine, and M. Cummings.
Generally, it is important to understand the theories of attachment in order to
understand the next discussion on the relationship between attachment and social
reasoning. As the research will show, there does seem to be mixed findings on this
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relationship, and there may be variables that mediate this relationship. Attachment may
be directly related to theory of mind because more securely attached children have more
opportunities for interaction with a caregiver, so there are also more opportunities to
develop joint attention and theory of mind.
Attachment and Social Reasoning
The first aim of this study is to examine the relationship between attachment
quality and social reasoning. Attachment quality and an aspect of social reasoning, theory
of mind, both have strong implications for psychological well-being, especially for social
competence and positive social relationships (Bosacki & Astington, 1999; Cassidy
Kirsch, Scolton, & Parke, 1996). There is evidence from previous studies showing a
positive association between higher levels of theory of mind ability in young children and
the quality of attachment (Fonagy, Redfern, & Charman, 1997; Fonagy, Steele, Steele, &
Holder, 1997; Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998), so the current study
will attempt to replicate these findings with a slightly older group of children. Less work
has been conducted to determine whether existing attachment with parents continues to
contribute to an understanding of mental states or higher order mental state attribution in
older children, past the age at which theory of mind first emerges, so the present study
will make an important contribution in this section of the literature. Furthermore, the
ability to perceive and reason about analogies between mental states has not been
explicitly related to attachment previously.
According to Humfress, O‟Connor, Slaughter, Target, and Fonagy (2002), there
are several reasons why there is an overlap between theory of mind and attachment
quality. First, the significant association may actually be an artifact, which would result
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from the fact that both of these measures are mediated by a third variable, such as verbal
intelligence. It is possible that attachment may be related to verbal intelligence because
those with more secure attachments are likely to be more comfortable seeking out social
interactions with others, which in turn may encourage the development of verbal
reasoning because of the increased opportunities to learn new words and how they are
used in different contexts (Block, 2006). Second, there are studies showing the social
interaction origins of both theory of mind ability and attachment quality. Specifically,
some aspects of social interaction that were shown to be predictive of better performance
on theory of mind tasks and attachment quality were sensitive caregiving and parental
openness to and encouragement of affect expression in the child (Bretherton, 1990;
Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Brown, Donelan-McCall & Dunn, 1996). In all, attachment
may be related to theory of mind because of third variables such as verbal intelligence
and social interaction.
Social reasoning and attachment quality may overlap simply because they are
part of the same developmental processes. For instance, Bowlby (1973) suggested that a
child‟s ability to attribute independent thoughts and feelings to self and others signaled
the fourth stage in the nature of the child-parent attachment relationship. In this stage, the
child learns that the mother-figure can be perceived as an independent object. Sooner or
later in this stage of development, the child is able to infer something of his mother‟s setgoals and something of the plans she is using to accomplish them. In addition, individual
differences in parental sensitivity and, as a consequence, child-parent attachment quality,
would influence a child‟s ability to develop an understanding of the caregiver‟s
perspective. Specifically, secure attachments facilitate a formation of organized mental
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representations of the attachment relationship that a child can use to predict the
attachment figure‟s behavior. Thus, this resembles what we know of as theory of mind,
where the child learns to understand the other person‟s perspective, allowing the child to
understand and predict behaviors of others. Thus, attachment can facilitate the
development of theory of mind and other aspects of social reasoning independently of the
advancement of language skills.
Thus there are several different hypotheses concerning the possible relationship
between attachment and social reasoning; (a) A more secure attachment leads to greater
social reasoning through enhanced language or verbal abilities, i.e. verbal reasoning
mediates the relationship between attachment and social reasoning, (b) a more secure
attachment directly facilitates greater social reasoning through the types of interactions
shared between the child and caregiver, i.e., gaze sharing, joint attention etc., (c) social
reasoning may appear to be enhanced in children with more secure attachments because
better attachment actually leads to enhanced cognition more broadly than merely within
the social domain, that is, sharing a close intimate bond with another may lead one to an
earlier metarepresentational capacity that leads to enhanced dual representation and
analogical reasoning abilities – therefore we would see children with more secure
attachments showing superior social reasoniong, but also greater analogical reasoning
skills in the physical reasoning tasks as well (more on this later), and (d) there may be no
relationship between attachment and social reasoning.
Meins et al. (1998) examined the longitudinal development of symbolic and
mentalising abilities in 33 children whose security of attachment was assessed in infancy.
Their main hypothesis was that mothers of securely attached children would be more
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likely to treat their children as individuals with minds, which would in turn influence the
child‟s ability to engage with other people on a mental level in that they can understand
other people‟s mental orientations to the world and the beliefs and desires that motivate
their behavior. The specific hypotheses were as follows: (a) securely attached children
would show a greater ability to include the verbal suggestions of an experimenter into
their pretend play (Study One); (b) Within the securely attached group, the mothers‟
greater tendency to treat their children as mental agents would be reflected in their
sensitivity to their children‟s current level of functioning and their tendency to describe
their children using mental characteristics (Study Two); and (c) securely attached
children would perform better than insecurely attached children on tasks requiring an
understanding of other minds (Studies Three and Four).
As for the measures used in the study by Meins and her colleagues (1998),
attachment security was assessed at 11 or 13 months using the Strange Situation
procedure developed by Mary Ainsworth. In the first study, symbolic play was assessed
at 31 months using two representational toys, a toy car and a female doll, and a selection
of junk objects such as a toilet roll inner tube and a piece of aluminum foil. There was an
introductory play session, which was followed by two types of structured play, an elicited
and an instructed condition. In Study Two, maternal tutoring sensitivity was measured
using a box construction task, which involved building a box identical to a model that had
already been assembled. The mothers‟ inclination to describe their children using mental
characteristics was measured using a short interview asking the mother to simply describe
their child. In Study Three, theory of mind ability was assessed using an unexpected
transfer task. In this particular task, the child was introduced to a soft toy called Charlie
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the Crocodile and was told that his favorite food was chocolate. The child witnessed the
chocolate being put in one of two small cardboard boxes, one being white and the other
red. The child was then told that Charlie was hiding his chocolate to keep it safe while he
went for a swim. Charlie was removed from the table, and the experimenter described
how they were going to play a trick on Charlie by taking the chocolate out of the box and
then place it in the other box with the lids of both boxes being closed. The experimenter
then told the child that Charlie was about to come back from this swim, so the child was
asked where Charlie would look for the chocolate. In the final study, the experimenters
used a false belief and emotion task to assess the young children‟s ability to understand
not only a character‟s current belief, but also to integrate this information with previous
knowledge about the character‟s preferences and desires in order to predict an emotional
response.
The results of the study by Meins and her colleagues (1998) showed that securely
attached children in infancy were able to add the verbal suggestions of an experimenter
into their play sequences at 31 months. In addition to this, mothers of securely attached
children were more likely to use sensitive tutoring strategies on a collaborative task with
their children who were three years of age at the time. Mothers of securely attached
children were also found to be more likely than mothers of insecurely attached children to
describe their children in terms of their mental characteristics. Another important result
was that securely attached children were more likely to pass the unexpected transfer task
at age four. As for the developmental pathways that may link security of attachment with
later symbolic and mentalising abilities, the authors of this study found that children‟s
initial security of attachment was a strong predictor of performance on the unexpected
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transfer task at age four, which, together with the mother‟s tendency to describe their
children in mentalising terms, in turn predicted performance on the advanced mentalising
task at age five. The authors suggest that mother-centered variables such as a mother‟s
sensitivity and consistency in caregiving are aspects of a secure attachment that may have
an influence on a child‟s ability to engage with another person on a mental level. So the
finding that a secure attachment is predictive of later mentalising ability may be due to
the fact that securely attached children are better able to recognize and act on alternative
perspectives of another person.
Consistent with the findings of Meins and her colleagues (1998), Humfress et al.
(2002) also found a positive relationship between attachment and theory of mind
(mentalising ability) in 70 early adolescents (mean age 12.6 years). In addition to this,
they examined the extent to which this relationship is potentially due to other variables,
namely verbal ability and parenting quality. This conclusion is consistent with the first
hypothesis in that the role of attachment in theory of mind development may be mediated
through language ability. Furthermore, sensitive caregiving and parental openness to and
encouragement of affect expression (parenting quality) have been found to be associated
with better theory of mind performance and secure attachment (Bretherton, 1990;
Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982).
In order to assess mentalising ability, Humfress and his colleagues (2002)
assigned ratings to children‟s attribution of mental states to characters in several vignettes
that are based on a subset of stories developed by Happe (1994). Specifically, there were
ten stories selected in which the subject had to infer pretence, lying, joking, telling a
white lie, etc. Child-parent attachment was measured using the Child Attachment
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Interview, which is a 19-question, semi-structured interview that assesses the children‟s
mental representations of attachment figures and significant others. Attachment quality is
indicated by an Overall Coherence Scale, which is a continuous scale and reflects the
quality of the child‟s representations of the attachment figure throughout the interview.
Verbal intelligence was measured using the Vocabulary subscale of the Weschler
Intelligence Scales for Children-III UK edition. Parenting quality was assessed by
examining scores on three dimensions important to parenting: Warmth/Support,
Conflict/Negativity, and Monitoring/Inductive Control.
Humfress and his colleagues (2002) found a significant association between
mentalising and attachment coherence in early adolescence (r = .35; attachment
coherence explained 12% of the variance in mentalising ability in their sample). This
relationship was partially mediated by verbal intelligence, although parenting quality was
found not to have an effect on this relationship. The authors suggested that this
connection between attachment and theory of mind is not limited to young children, as
they found this relationship in early adolescence as well, which according to them, can be
explained by the role of parenting sensitivity that promotes the capacity of the child to be
aware of, label, and understand thoughts of feelings of self and other. A child‟s
understanding of one‟s own intentionality is thought to transfer to the actions and
reactions of others, so then children begin to view themselves and others as intentional
agents.
In contrast to the above studies, the last few studies discussed found a stronger
role for variables other than attachment that impact theory of mind development. For
instance, stronger weight was given to other variables such as maternal sensitivity and
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elaborative discourse. Symons and Clark (2000) examined the hypothesis that various
features of early mother-child relationships in infancy contribute to the development of
social understanding and theory of mind by the end of the preschool period. The authors
of this study examined their hypothesis with forty-six mothers and their children (20
girls, 26 boys) who they followed from birth. The children were observed when they
were two years of age and again at around five years of age. Aspects of the mother-child
relationship that were assessed were as follows: maternal emotional distress (self-report
measures that focused on maternal depressive symptoms, state and trait anxiety, parental
stress, coping behavior, and social support), depression (used the Centre for
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale), situational and dispositional anxiety
(measured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Y), stress specific to the parent-child
relationship (assessed using the Parenting Stress Index-Form 6), coping resources
(Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations), social support, attachment security and
maternal sensitivity (assessed using two complementary q-sort measures), and maternal
behavior (measured using the Maternal Behavior Q-Sort).
Social understanding and theory of mind ability were assessed using three sets of
false belief tasks (Symons & Clark, 2000). There were six object identity tasks where
children are sequentially given six objects whose real identity or logical contents of a
container differed from their apparent identities or actual contents. Two object location
tasks were also developed from Wimmer and Perner‟s (1983) unexpected transfer task. In
these two tasks acted out with DUPLO and LEGO materials, a central character (e.g.,
Sarah) hides an object such as a toy radio and leaves the room. A foil (e.g., a monkey)
relocates the object, and the character returns to the scene. The children were then given
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the character and were asked a set of questions such as “Show me what Sarah will do
next” and “Where will Sarah look for the toy radio?” In addition to these tasks, there
were three caregiver location tasks that were modeled after the object location tasks, had
the same format, and were acted out using LEGO characters and materials. The only
difference is that the caregiver tasks used searches for a parent-character rather than an
object, and situations therefore included the separation of a child-character from their
parent in home, beach, and clothing store change room settings. Mother-characters were
used to activate attachment behavior.
The results of Symons and Clark‟s study (2000) showed that object location task
performance was related to a concurrent home-based observational measure of
attachment security (r = .30). In contrast to their hypothesis, attachment security and
maternal sensitivity at age two did not predict object location task performance. Another
finding was that sensitive parenting and maternal emotional distress in infancy were
predictive of caregiver location performance at age five. Even though sensitive parenting
is closely associated with attachment, the current study‟s data points to a generalized
measure of sensitive parenting as being more predictive of theory of mind performance
than antecedent or concurrent attachment security. Maternal sensitivity is an aspect of the
mother-child relationship and reflects the mother‟s parental warmth and acceptance,
availability for interactions, and appropriate responsiveness within social interchange.
Moreover, it also involves the mother being available for interactions, cognizant of the
child needs, and meeting these needs in a timely manner. The authors suggested that this
maternal sensitivity may be important to theory of mind acquisition because children who
have experienced responsive relationships are more likely to view relationships in these
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terms and be empathetic to the perspective to others. Despite the finding that maternal
sensitivity was a stronger predictor than attachment security of theory of mind
performance, the authors suggested that the attachment measure they used may lose
important distinctions between insecure-avoidant and insecure-resistant infants because
the attachment measure provides only a single quantitative measure on a security
dimension.
Also, it may be important to recognize that maternal warmth and sensitivity may
not be completely independent of attachment security. Lohaus, Keller, Ball, Voelker, &
Elbin (2004), discuss how the literature is mixed with regards to the relationship between
sensitivity and attachment. Thus, Lohaus and his colleagues set out to investigate the
relationship between maternal sensitivity and attachment. They found that an assessment
of attachment of the participants at 12 months of age was not predicted by the sensitivity
ratings at three months. This finding suggests that there may be other factors other than
sensitivity that influence the development of attachment, although this does not
necessarily mean that sensitivity is completely independent of the development of
attachment.
Ontai and Thompson (2008) studied the relationships among attachment, motherchild discourse, and theory of mind in 76 four-year-old children (36 males) with a mean
age of 4.48 years. The authors hypothesized that attachment would have a direct
association with theory of mind, but that mother-child discourse could interact with
attachment security in the prediction of theory of mind performance. They also examined
whether or not the mother‟s use of mental state terms in conversations had an influence
on theory of mind performance. In the study, theory of mind was assessed using four
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tasks: one standard unexpected location task, one requiring the child to attribute an
emotion to a story character holding a false belief, one unexpected location task involving
the mother as the character, and one emotion attribution task involving the mother as the
character. In the unexpected location task, children were told to predict where a story
character would look and why after his/her candy bar was moved to a new location
without his or her knowledge. In the emotion-attribution task, children were told to
predict and explain how a character would feel before and after finding the contents of
their favorite drink were switched with another drink. For the caregiver theory of mind
tasks, they were modeled after the emotion-attribution task using mothers as the main
characters and the child as the protagonist.
The mother-child elaborative discourse was measured by asking mothers to talk to
their children about a past event in which they participated together. Whenever the
mother took a turn in the conversation, their turns were coded for elaborations (statement
or question that moves the conversation to a new aspect of the event or adds information
about an aspect), fill in the blank (provides all but a single piece of information and
pauses, waiting for the child to utter that missing piece), evaluations (confirms or negates
a child‟s previous utterance), repetitions (repeating the gist of their own previous
statement), memory prompts (requesting for more information from the child without
providing any additional information), and preference (questions that ask for the child‟s
preference). A mother‟s elaborative score is obtained by computing the proportion of
clauses in which mothers used elaboration, fill in the blank clauses, or evaluations in
relation to the total of all coded clauses. Mother-child mental state discourse was
measured in the context of event conversations, which were also coded for maternal use
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of direct references to mental states that can be defined as references related to will,
mind, imagination, interest, intellect, and so on. Attachment security was measured using
the attachment q-sort, which consists of 90 descriptive statements of young children‟s
behavior during interactions with their primary caregiver.
The results of the study by Ontai and Thompson (2008) showed that maternal
elaborative discourse is a stronger predictor of children‟s theory of mind understanding (r
= .30) than explicit maternal references to the mind. In contrast to previous research, they
also found that attachment security did not independently predict theory of mind.
Security of attachment also did not interact with maternal discourse variables in the
prediction of theory of mind performance. The authors suggested that a lack of a positive
finding may be due to the restricted range of attachment scores that may underlie the
associations found in their study, along with the fact that the assessment of maternal
conversational style was done using only one conversation, which may not give enough
attention to the importance of secure attachment in helping children to understand
negative or conflicting feelings. In addition to this result, maternal mental state references
did not predict theory of mind performance. The authors suggest that the stronger
predictive influence of elaborative discourse on theory of mind performance may be
because of the multiple paths that it uses to provoke mental state understanding in
children, beyond the explicit mental state references in maternal utterances. Elaborative
discourse may be valuable in the development of theory of mind because it interacts with
the child‟s utterances in providing paths for provoking a deeper conceptual understanding
of mental states by building on the child‟s own conversational utterances in ways that
provoke a deeper insight. Elaborative discourse may build verbal intelligence in the child,
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so this study may provide evidence for verbal intelligence as a mediator of the
relationship between attachment and theory of mind.
In summary, the existing data regarding the relationship between attachment and
theory of mind seems to be mixed. Some studies have shown a strong direct relationship
between attachment and theory of mind, whereas others have not, with some showing a
stronger relationship between maternal discourse (mental state language references) or
verbal ability with theory of mind. In addition to this, some studies have shown that
verbal ability may partially mediate the relationship between attachment and theory of
mind. The present study attempts to clear up some of these inconsistencies by examining
the direct relationship between attachment and social reasoning, while also considering
the possibility that language or verbal reasoning may mediate this relationship. Some of
the studies that failed to find a relationship between attachment and theory of mind had a
restricted range in attachment classifications, which can decrease any possibility that the
two variables can be related. The current study will attempt to directly assess the extent to
which verbal reasoning serves as a mediating variable in the relationship between
attachment and social reasoning but will also assess social reasoning within an analogical
reasoning task, and present that task in contrast with an analogous physical reasoning task
– tasks which may provide assessments of cognitive skills more broadly construed. Thus,
one hypothesis for the present study is that more securely attached children will perform
better than more insecurely attached children on social reasoning tasks with verbal
reasoning mediating this relationship.
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Attachment and Broader Cognitive Abilities
The second aim of this study seeks to examine the relationship between
attachment and cognitive abilities more broadly, looking at the impact of attachment on
relational or analogical reasoning, and contrasting the effects on social versus physical
reasoning tasks within an analogical reasoning problem. There appears to be a gap in the
literature with regards to the direct relationship between attachment and analogical
reasoning, so the present study can attempt to fill this gap. There are theoretical reasons
to assume a relationship between attachment and a broader suite of representational
abilities given the research described above and the following theoretical background.
Most of the previous research has explored relationships between attachment and
language, along with language and analogical reasoning, so it is logical to suppose that
language may mediate the relationship between attachment and analogical reasoning.
As Tomasello (1999) and Vygotsky (1978) point out, early attachment
relationships or early social experiences are important to the development of language,
although joint attention may interact with attachment and exert an influence on language
development as well. A study by Murray and Yingling (2000) investigated the links
between attachment, home stimulation, and language development in 58 toddlers (36
medically high risk and 22 low risk) at 24 months of age. Specifically, they hypothesized
that knowledge of the mother‟s role as a secure base and as a teacher would increase
one‟s ability to predict language development in children. They also hypothesized that an
emotionally responsive and a cognitively stimulating home environment would predict
language competence. Security of attachment was measured using Ainsworth‟s Strange
Situation (Ainsworth et al., 1978) at 21 months, while receptive and expressive language
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was evaluated by a speech pathologist who used the Receptive and Expressive Emergent
Language Scale. The HOME Inventory was used to assess the degree to which the
mother acted as a teacher/stimulator. The results showed that attachment and the
stimulating characteristics of the mother had an additive effect on language development,
specifically, receptive language development. In addition to this, attachment and HOME
scores were not correlated, which suggests that these two variables make independent
contributions to a child‟s language development. Attachment security was found to
significantly predict expressive language scores, while scores on the HOME Inventory
did not. In all, attachment was found to account for 16% of the variance in the model.
Tomasello (1999) noted that language seems to be important to the development
of analogical reasoning as evidenced by the fact that those with language impairments
often express difficulties with more general cognitive abilities including analogical
reasoning. A study by Bandurski and Galkowski (2004) found that both deaf children and
hearing children were able to develop skills in analogical reasoning as long as they
experienced early and consistent language, whether it be sign language or spoken
language. This result suggests that learning language is important to the development of
analogical reasoning, even if an individual cannot hear. It is those with language
impairments or difficulty in learning a language that have trouble with analogical
reasoning because language promotes the abstraction process that is necessary in
analogical reasoning.
Baldwin and Saylor (1995) also advocated the importance of language to
analogical reasoning because it promotes abstraction and highlights any non-obvious
commonalities among objects and events. Evidence for this may come from a study by
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Kotovosky and Gentner (1996) who tested a key claim of the knowledge-change view
that learning about domain relations should increase identification of relational similarity
among objects or stimuli; thus, children are better able to complete an analogical
reasoning task when they have appropriate knowledge of a particular domain. They
reasoned that they could test this prediction by using relational language, or labels for
higher-order relations, to increase the salience of the common relational structure of the
stimuli. They taught a group of four-year-olds to label and categorize the higher-order
relations of symmetry and monotonicity (the stimuli were increasing or decreasing in
size) and then tested them using a series of analogical reasoning tasks. They hypothesized
that training on the higher-order relations would lead to increased relational performance
when the children were later tested with a series of analogical reasoning tasks. This
hypothesis was confirmed. The authors concluded that learning to label and categorize
higher-order relations improved four-year-olds‟ performance in recognizing higher-order
commonalities. Thus, relational language made relational patterns more salient for the
children and promoted relational learning through the use of a common label that leads
children to search for relational commonalities such as symmetry and monotonicity
between two different situations. In essence, language allows for abstraction, which
assists the child in finding any similarities among the stimuli.
Thus, the proposed study will also test the relationship between attachment and
analogical reasoning with language as a possible mediator of that relationship. Even
though individuals with insecure attachments do develop language, those with secure
attachments are likely to be more comfortable seeking out social interactions with others,
which in turn may encourage more advanced development of language because of the
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increased opportunities to learn new words and how they are used in different contexts
(Block, 2006). Thus, children with more secure attachments may be more likely to have
advanced language or verbal reasoning skills. Additionally, language allows an individual
to think about things that are not in one‟s direct visual field, and eventually allows one to
think more abstractly. This ability to think more abstractly may allow an individual to
process analogies more efficiently. Overall, we predict that securely attached children
will perform better than insecurely attached children on two analogical reasoning tasks; a
social and a physical reasoning task. Language should be a mediator of this relationship.
Differences in Performance on Social Reasoning and Physical Reasoning
The final aim of this study is to examine whether there are differences in
performance on social reasoning tasks and physical reasoning tasks, in order to assess
whether the assumed benefits of a secure attachment on a child‟s developing cognitive
abilities are domain-specific, presumably limited to the social domain, or are more
broadly construed. Social reasoning in the present study refers to tasks that involve
reasoning about emotional states, whereas physical reasoning tasks involve reasoning
about activity states, but do not involve the attribution of or inferences about other
people‟s internal mental states. In the related literature, researchers generally use the term
“social reasoning” to refer to tasks that involve reasoning about what others are thinking
or feeling, that is involve theory of mind. We have chosen to assess cognition more
broadly by designing an analogical reasoning task that can involve the attribution of
mental states (in this case, specifically emotions) in one version, but allows for the
creation of an analogous task that still taps into analogical reasoning, but outside of the
social domain. By creating analogous tasks we have avoided confounding variables such
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as verbal, non-verbal tasks, for example. Some researchers who have assessed
performance on these two variables have used different types of tasks for each, some of
which are more verbally oriented and others that were nonverbal, such as using
photographs in place of characters or objects. As will be discussed, children with autism
were able to perform better on tasks involving photographs rather than the standard falsebelief tasks that are more verbal in nature (Zaitchik, 1990). Researchers such as Leslie
(1987) have taken this finding to mean that children with autism generally have difficulty
reasoning about psychological states and not about non-psychological states; however it
is possible that it was the verbal dimension of the task, and not the mental state
attribution component per se that caused the children with autism the difficulty.
For instance, Zaitchik (1990) used a false-belief task; however, he replaced a lot
of the verbalizations or narrative with photographs. The standard false-belief task
involves Sally first placing a marble in a basket and then going away for a walk. While
Sally is away, Ann removes the marble and puts it in a box. The child, or participant in
the task, is asked about where Sally put the marble in the beginning, where it is now, and
where Sally will look for the marble on her return (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Zaitchik
(1990) replaced Sally with a Polaroid camera and Sally‟s belief is replaced by a Polaroid
photograph. The marble is still placed in the basket; however, instead of Sally forming a
belief about the marble in the basket, the camera forms a photograph in the basket. The
photo is then placed face down on the table, and the marble is then removed from the
basket and placed in the box. The child is now asked a different set of questions: Where
was the marble when the photograph was taken; where is the marble now really; and
where in the photograph is the marble. For typically-developing children, both the
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standard false-belief task and the one using photographs are equally difficult. Most
typically-developing three-year-olds will fail both tasks, while most four-year-olds pass
both tasks. Despite this, there is a small but reliable effect that, if they pass only one of
these tasks, it is the false belief instead of the photographs task. In contrast to this,
children with autism will perform at or near the ceiling on the photographs tasks, while
they fail standard false-belief tasks (Zaitchik, 1990).
Similar results have been obtained with drawings and maps (Charman & BaronCohen, 1992; Leekman & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Like photographs,
drawings and maps also tend to stand for something else. So as discussed above, children
with autism were able to understand the false photographs better than the false belief
tasks even though the procedures, instructions, any syntactic forms of questioning used in
both the false photograph and false belief tasks were almost identical. In contrast,
typically developed children tend to find false belief tests at least as easy as tests of
similarly false representation by a camera. Although these studies may suggest specific
deficits in representations of mental states for children with ASD, most of the studies
used a drawing or a photograph to stand for something else.That is, children with autism
were able to perform well on tasks that involved photographs, drawings, and photographs
(which stand for something else), but they were not able to do well on tasks that involved
representing mental states.
According to Leslie‟s (1987) and Perner‟s (1993) metarepresentational theories,
children with autism are able to directly represent objects, situations, and real-world
scenarios, but they are not able to represent representations of representations.
Declarative sentences, drawings, and beliefs that were used in the false-belief tasks and
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the tasks involving photographs all stand in representational relations to their objects. To
represent that relation is to metarepresent, to form a higher-order representation of a firstorder representational relation. An example would be “that sentence says that X is F” or
“that painting is about F.” Initially, the metarepresentational theory was proposed to
explain how children with autism‟s difficulty with theory of mind tasks are due to a
generalized inability with metarepresentation, which manifests itself in social contexts as
an inability to form beliefs about others‟ mental states-hence the difficulty with theory of
mind tasks or reasoning about psychological states (Gerrans, 1998).
This account does not explain why children with autism perform better on falsephotograph tasks and not as well on the standard theory of mind tasks (whereas typically
developing children do better than children with autism on the standard theory of mind
tasks). Leslie‟s (1987) explanation for this finding is that the standard false-belief tasks
require more of a capacity to metarepresent psychological states that is separate from a
generalized metarepresentational capacity. Thus, it would seem that children with autism
are able to metarepresent or to form a higher-order representation of a first-order
representational relation, but they are not able to do this with psychological states. In
contrast to this, typically-developing children seem to have an advantage on the social
reasoning or theory of mind tasks. This suggests a domain specific skill for reasoning
about mental states that may be enhanced by language related skills.
In the present study, we investigate whether or not typically developing children
have an advantage on social reasoning tasks that may be enhanced through verbal
reasoning, or through the formation of more secure attachments. Because typically
developed children do well on the standard false-belief task, this suggests a domain-
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specific skill for reasoning about mental states that could potentially be enhanced through
language skills. The present study can determine if typically developed children do
poorly on the physical reasoning task (which would be akin to the false-photograph task
in that it does not require reasoning about psychological states) compared to the social
reasoning task – but still requires dual representation. If they were to do poorly on both
types of tasks, it may suggest a problem with generalized metarepresentation or problems
with analogical reasoning more broadly. These specific differences in performance may
suggest the existence of two different types of reasoning, namely social and physical
reasoning.
Other studies from both the animal literature and human literature support the idea
that there are two different types of intelligence or reasoning (Brauer, Kaminski, Riedel,
Call & Tomasello, 2006; Cosmides, 1989; Herrmann et al., 2007, 2010; Scott & BaronCohen, 1996), so the present study will also attempt to test this idea as well as Leslie‟s
(1987) theory. Scott & Baron Cohen (1996) provided evidence in support of Cosmides‟
(1989) theory that specific brain systems in humans may have evolved specifically to
solve social and intentional (or non-social) problems. Specifically, they conducted a
study with children who had autism to assess whether or not social and nonsocial
intelligence are independent of each other and if the difficulty of children with autism on
theory of mind tasks is due to an underlying deficit in abstract reasoning rather than
specific reasoning about mental states). They found that children with autism have
deficits in mental state reasoning in particular and not with general abstract reasoning.
The study by Cosmides (1989) suggests that human intelligence evolved in order
to solve social problems that arise in a social context. For instance, the results of her
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study showed that the performance of normal adults on tests of logical reasoning (using
the Wasoncard sorting problems) is facilitated when the problems are set within a social
context of exchange and deception. The participants are given four cards in the Wason
Task. Each card has a p or a p‟ on one side and a q or a q‟ on the other side. They are then
asked which card he or she needs to turn over to identify violations to the rule, “If p, then
q.” Normal adult participants do not do well on this particular task because they turn over
cards that are not relevant to this rule. For example, they turn over p and q‟ even though
these cards are not relevant to the task. On the other hand, when the participants are given
social rules of the same logical complexity, such as “If a person buys alcohol, then or she
must be 18 years of age,” they do well at checking for violations to the rule in a more
logical manner. If they see a card with a person that is under 18 for instance, they would
turn it over to see if the person is drinking alcohol. They were not likely to turn over a
card that showed someone who is over the age of 18 because it has no social
consequences. Generally, Cosmides (1989) suggests that typical adults have a propensity
to reason well when these sorts of rules from the Wason Task are given within a social
context. This is support for the fact that reasoning within the social domain may be
superior to that within the physical domain for most typically developed humans; both
adults and children. Based on this study and other studies previously discussed (Zaitchik,
1990), this leads to the third main hypothesis of the present study, which is that typically
developed individuals will perform better overall on social reasoning tasks than on
physical reasoning tasks, regardless of attachment or verbal IQ.
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The Present Study
In the present study, social and physical reasoning were assessed in analogous
match-to-sample tasks. The only difference between the tasks was the type of stimuli
presented in each task. For the social reasoning task, the participant was required to
reason or make inferences about emotional states, whereas in the physical reasoning task,
the participant was required to make inferences about a physical task that individuals
were engaged in. Both versions of the task were designed in an attempt to ensure that the
participants were not responding to particular physical features of the images used, so
that the tasks were of equivalent difficulty and successful performance could not be
achieved by a perceptual feature analysis alone.
The specific aim of this study is to examine the relationship between attachment
and verbal reasoning and two types of reasoning: social reasoning and physical reasoning
within the context of an analogical reasoning task. There are several different possible
outcomes or alternative pattern of results that could be obtained from this study:
Hypothesis 1: Children who score high on attachment will perform better than
children who score low on attachment on social reasoning tasks. Hypothesis 1a: Verbal
reasoning will mediate the relationship between attachment and social reasoning.
Hypothesis 2: Children who score high on attachment will perform better than
children who score low on attachment on both social and physical reasoning (analogical
reasoning) tasks. This result would suggest a broader advantage for attachment than
facilitating social reasoning alone, such that greater attachment might enhance analogical
reasoning across social and physical domains. Hypothesis 2a: Verbal reasoning will
mediate the relationship between attachment and analogical reasoning tasks.
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Little research has examined the relationship between attachment and social
reasoning in typically developing children, and the research has been mixed. Some
studies have found a relationship between attachment and theory of mind, while others
have not. The majority of these studies used false-belief tasks to measure theory of mind
reasoning. The present study will utilize a different measure of social reasoning.
Additionally, not many of the studies used verbal intelligence as a mediator, so the
present study will include a measure of verbal reasoning as a mediator of the relationship
between attachment and both social and physical reasoning tasks. Humfress et al. (2002)
suggested that verbal intelligence may help explain the relationship between attachment
and theory of mind. Tomasello (1999) also suggested that early social experiences are
important to the development of language, while language is also important to the
development of social reasoning such as theory of mind. Thus, the purpose of assessing
language as a mediator is based on prior research (as discussed earlier) and theory. No
known research has directly examined the relationship between attachment and
analogical reasoning, so this aspect of the study can make a significant contribution to the
literature.
The third aim of this study will assess differences in performance on social
reasoning and physical reasoning tasks. In addition to allowing us to assess whether any
effects of attachment and verbal reasoning were specific to social reasoning or general to
analogical reasoning across both tasks, this comparison also allows us to assess Leslie‟s
(1987) ideas about the generalized metarepresentational capacity and the
metarepresentational capacity for psychological states. Leslie proposed that children with
autism are missing the metarepresentational capacity for psychological states. So,
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presumably, typically-developing children should do well on tasks that involve
metarepresentation of psychological states, an idea that is supported by several of the
studies discussed earlier (Zaitchik, 1990). These findings imply that typically-developing
children should do better on social reasoning tasks in general. This brings us to
Hypothesis 3: Typically developed children should perform better on a social reasoning
task than on a physical reasoning task.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
We tested 67 typically-developing children who ranged in age from 8.80 to 12.60
(the mean age was 11.00). Furthermore, 32 of the participants were female and 35 of the
participants were male. Based on an article by Kotovosky and Gentner (1996), who
suggested that most 8-year-olds (90% or so) can reason relationally, we targeted eightyear-olds for pilot testing of the analogical reasoning tasks. Due to poor performance on
the pilot tests, the target age range for the study was increased to nine to eleven years of
age. The children were recruited from elementary schools, child development centers,
and daycares in Hattiesburg, MS and Ocean Springs, MS. Most of our sample came from
North Taconi Elementary in Ocean Springs, MS and through the University of Southern
Mississippi‟s psychology participant pool (i.e. children of our undergraduate students).
No children were excluded from the study based on gender or other criteria.
Measures/Materials
Attachment Security
The Security Scale was used to assess children‟s perceptions of security in parentchild relationships in middle childhood and early adolescence (Kerns et al. 1996). We
typically assessed children‟s perceptions of security in their mother, but if the birth
mother was not the primary caretaker, they were asked to answer questions about their
father or stepmother, grandmother/grandfather –whoever the primary caretaker was.
Items on the Security Scale tap the following in relation to specific attachment
relationships: (a) the degree to which children believe that a particular attachment figure
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is responsive and available; (b) the child‟s tendency to rely on the attachment figure in
times of stress; and (c) the child‟s ease and interest in communicating with the attachment
figure. This measure includes 15 items that are on a 4-point scale using Harter‟s (1982)
“Some kids…other kid” format. Children are instructed to indicate which statement is
more characteristic of them and then to indicate whether the statement was really true (1)
for them or sort of true (4) for them. The items for the Security Scale are indicated in
Appendix A. Items are scored on a 4-point scale with higher scores indicating a more
secure attachment. To obtain a continuous dimension of security, scores across items are
averaged.
As for the reliability of this measure, coefficient alphas for third-grade
participants were .63 and .82, for mother and father, respectively, while the coefficients
for sixth-grade participants were .79 and .87, for mother and father, respectively. Testretest reliability is indicated by coefficients of .84 and .88, respectively, for two studies
with 10- to 12-year-old children and a 14-day interval test-retest correlation of r(30) =
.75. As for criterion validity, children‟s reports of security were related to children‟s
ratings of self-concept, peer ratings of liking, observer ratings of interactions with
friends, and mother reports of acceptance of the child (Kerns et al., 1996). Discriminant
validity is also evidenced by the fact that security scores were not related to school grade
point average or to children‟s self-perceptions of athletic competence (Kerns et al., 1996).
Children from the third grade sample in the Kerns et al. (1996) study participated in a
follow-up study two years later (Contreras, Kerns, Weimer, Gentzler, & Tomich, 2000;
Kerns, Tomich, Aspelmeier, & Contreras, 2000). Children involved in this study
completed the Separation Anxiety Test (SAT; Resnick, 1993), a projective interview that
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assesses children‟s state of mind with respect to attachment. Security scores were found
to be associated to both the ratings and classifications from the SAT. This measure was
selected for the current study because it was the most age-appropriate measure that did
not require extensive observation and lacked some of the difficulties associated with
discrete measures of attachment (Ainsworth et al. 1978). Using a continuous measure of
attachment allows for easier measurement of correlations with other continuous measures
such as verbal reasoning.
Verbal Reasoning
In the present study, we assessed language skills with a measure of verbal
reasoning; the verbal subscale of the Weschler Intelligence Scale for Children-3rd edition
(Weschler, 1991), which is designed as a measure of a child‟s intellectual and cognitive
ability. We used the WISC-III rather than the WISC-IV because we wished to avoid the
possibility of contaminating later educational testing, given that a lot of schools currently
use the WISC-IV for assessment. The subtests are common across both the WISC-III and
WISC-IV, so conclusions based on either are valid for the purposes of this study, which
are not diagnostic in nature. For the purposes of this study, the Verbal Comprehension
Index (VCI), which is part of the WISC-III, was used to assess verbal reasoning. This
scale includes four subtests: Vocabulary, Comprehension, Information, and Similarities.
Reliability of the WISC-III is evident in a number of ways, although the focus
here will be on the Verbal Comprehensive Index and its related subscales. As for internal
consistency, the Verbal Comprehension Index has a coefficient of .94 (Weschler, 1991).
For the specific subtests that were used in our study, the average coefficients were .87
(Vocabulary), .81 (Similarities), .77 (Comprehension), and 84 (Information). These
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internal consistency coefficients were the averages across all age groups (age 6-16). Testretest reliability was assessed using intervals ranging from 12-63 days and six different
age groups. Generally, the WISC-III scores possessed adequate stability across time and
across age groups. For the Verbal Comprehension Index, the average corrected stability
coefficient for all ages is .93. For the related subscales, the stability coefficients were .89
for Vocabulary, .81 for Similarities, .85 for Information, and .73 for Comprehension.
Construct validity in the WISC-III has been investigated through factor analyses.
First of all, numerous studies have demonstrated the existence of a global intelligence
construct that is significantly related to important social criteria such as academic
achievement and educational attainment. Furthermore, Carroll (1989) has used
hierarchical factor analysis to show the presence of g and other high order factors in the
WISC-III. As for the other factors of the WISC, numerous studies have confirmed the
existence of two major factors underlying the subtests of the WISC-III, Verbal and
Performance. Criterion validity has also been investigated in the WISC-III. Concurrent
studies have been done on the WISC-III and WPPSI (Quereshi & McIntire, 1984). For
the Full Scale IQ, the correlation was .85, while the correlation for the Verbal
Intelligence Scale was .86.
Basic Materials
The MTS tasks were presented on an HP Tablet tx2100us Notebook PC with a
touch screen monitor. Additionally, images used for the MTS tasks were 400 X 600
pixels standardized images, downloaded from FOTOSEARCH.com. Images will be
described in more detail below in the context of the Procedure. Stickers and stickerbooks
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were used as reinforcements, so that after completing the WISC and security scale
measures the child had a completed sticker page that he/she could take with him/her.
Procedure
All assessments/measures were set up and ready to go before the parent and the
child arrived at each session. Once the parent and child arrived, they were greeted and
directed to a private room where all paperwork/informed consent was completed. Before
the experiment began, the parent was asked to sign a consent form for the child‟s
participation in the study. After completing all paperwork, the parent was directed back
into the waiting room or seating area. This sequence of events occurred if the study was
conducted at the university. If the study was conducted at a school during school hours,
the child would have brought the signed consent form back to the school. Then, the child
was removed from regular activities and taken to a separate room for testing by the
experimenter who worked with the teachers to ensure that the testing was minimally
disruptive to the child‟s regular activities. Occasionally, when two testers were available,
two children were brought out of their daily activities in order to complete testing at the
same time.
The order in which the tasks were given was counterbalanced across all of the
children. The children were told they could take a break between tasks if they needed to.
Testing took place over one day for each participant, and it took approximately 40
minutes to one hour to complete all measures.
Category Match-To-Sample.
In order to assess the children‟s comprehension of analogies using the MTS
paradigm, it is of course essential that they first understand the basic procedure we used
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to test their analogical competency. We initially tested 10 children using the same task to
ensure that children of this age could complete the task that we used in testing. In
addition to allowing us to assess whether children understood the basic MTS procedure,
this task also provided a measure of whether the children could discriminate what is
being depicted in the stimuli – that is whether they ascertained the activity and emotion
being depicted.
For this task, the experimenter sat next to the child who sat directly in front of a
laptop tablet computer with a touch screen. During the Category MTS task, each child
received a total of 24 trials that were separated into two 12 trial sessions. There were 12
trials involving matching of emotions and 12 trials involving matching of physical
activities. For the emotion matching trials, there were four total emotions used
(happiness, sadness, anger, fear) with each emotion category being used as a sample three
times, and a different image being used each time. For example, a sample image
depicting happiness was used three times as a sample, and was presented with a correct
match depicting happiness (although it wase a different image than the one used in the
sample), and with an exemplar from each of the other emotion categories as incorrect
matches once. For instance, since happiness was used as a sample for three trials,
incorrect matches depicted different emotions such as anger, surprise, and sadness. For
the physical activity trials, there were four total activity categories used (cooking, art,
school, and sports), with each activity being used three times as a sample – a different
particular exemplar from that category each time. For example, an image depicting sports
was used three times a sample, which was matched with another, but different image,
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depicting sports, and paired with each of the other three activities once as the incorrect
matches.
During both the social and physical reasoning trials of the category match-tosample task, an image appeared in the center of the monitor. The child touched the image
in order for two comparison images to appear. The sample then minimized and appeared
at the bottom of the screen, centered, and two new images appear aligned at the top of the
screen. Then, the child‟s task was to select from the two comparison images the one that
matched the sample in terms of depicting an image from the same category (either the
same emotion or the same physical activity). Photographs were presented and paired
randomly with the constraint that the correct options appeared on one side of the screen
no more than three times in a row. If the child selected the correct match, a pleasant tone
sounded, and the experimenter wrote down a tally mark to keep track of the ones that the
child got correct (so the child could get stickers for correct answers later). The
experimenter then said “that‟s right; great job!” If the child touched the non-match, an
unpleasant buzzer sounded, and the experimenter said “that‟s ok, try again!” The next
sample then appeared and the procedure continued until the child has completed all 24
trials (2 separate sessions of 12 trials each). At the end of the 12th trial for each task, an
output screen appeared which informed the experimenter of the child‟s level of
performance. If the ten children we tested as pilot participants achieved a mean level of
performance of 80% on each task, social and physical, we began recruiting participants
for our study that included the main reasoning tasks. It was based on performance on this
pilot testing that we initially decided to test approximately 60-100 children on the testing
procedure as well, and subsequently determined that we needed to test older children than
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initially believed, because the computer tasks proved too difficult for eight year old
children to master.
Testing
This phase included two 24-trial sessions (24 trials each for social reasoning and
physical reasoning) of relational matching. Half of the children (randomly assigned)
received the social reasoning task first and half of the children received the physical
reasoning task first. Both tasks followed the same basic procedure as the pilot training
tasks, except that, instead of the correct comparison image being an exact match to the
sample image, it was one that depicted the same analogical relationship as the sample
(sameness or difference). Within each 24-trial session, there were 12 trials devoted to the
analogical relationship of sameness, while the other 12 trials were devoted to the
analogical relationship of difference. Same and different trials were presented in random
order, with the constraint that no more than three trials of each type can be presented in a
row. The experimenter did not provide any hints, guidance or assistance of any kind
during Testing except to encourage the child by saying “good try, keep trying” when the
child is incorrect, and to praise the child and give the child stickers when the child is
correct.
Initially we gave the children a set of instructions to follow, which avoided the
use of any terms such as “same” and “different” and deliberately provided little guidance
as to what specifically determined the nature of the analogy between the sample and
comparison images. However, very early on, it was easy to see that the the children had
difficulty understanding and completing the reasoning tasks. After modification of the
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instructions through working with the first few participants, these were our final set of
instructions that were given to each child for both sets of reasoning tasks:
So you will be seeing a series of pairs of photographs on the computer screen and
what I want you to do is to pay attention to the pair of photos that you see at the
bottom of the screen just like these ones. Now what you should do is look
carefully at this pair of photos and look to see if you think these two photos are
showing you two things that are different from each other or two things that are
the same as each other. Then, I want you to hold the photos down like this
(demonstrate) either with your finger, or this pen, whichever you prefer, until
these two other pairs of photos appear at the top of the screen. Now I want you to
look at these two pairs of photos and try to figure out which ONE has the same
relationship between them as is shown by the pair of photos at the bottom of the
screen. So, if you think the two photos in the pair at the bottom are the same as
each other, then you should choose the pair of photos at the top of the screen that
are the same as each other. But, if you think the two photos at the bottom are
different from each other, choose the pair at the top that are different from each
other. You can only choose EITHER the pair of photos on the left OR the rightyou can‟t choose both. You choose just by touching whichever pair you think
shows the same relationship between the two photos as is shown by the pair of
photos in the bottom pair of photos.
It was decided that it was better to reduce frustration and floor performance by providing
more guidance in the task. Participants still did not achieve ceiling level performance,
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and we were still able to obtain differences in performance between the social and
physical versions of the task, which still allowed us to test our critical hypotheses.
Social Reasoning
The goal of the task was to select the comparison image that matches the sample
image by demonstrating the same analogical relationship between the two images
depicted. For half the trials, the correct matches were similar emotions. For example, a
sample stimulus depicted two different images of people experiencing the same emotion
(e.g. both are sad). The correct match depicted the image that shows two different people
sharing the same emotion, but a different emotion than that depicted in the sample (for
example both are happy). Thus the analogical relationship between the images is one of
sameness or same emotional state or shared emotional state between the two people
depicted but the exact emotional state between the sample and the correct comparison
image is not the same. On the other half of trials the sample stimulus depicted two
different images of people experiencing different emotions, so the correct match was the
image showing two different people experiencing different emotions (but emotions that
are either the same or different from the sample image). Here, the analogical relationship
between the two images is one of difference (two different emotional states). Correct and
incorrect options occurred equally often on each side of the screen, with correct options
occurring no more than three times consecutively on one side.
The images that were used in this study depicted combinations of four different
mental states or emotions (fear, anger, sadness, and happiness) using 72 composite image
pairs. Within the categories of emotion, the images did not simply depict facial
expressions so that the images can be identified on the basis of a salient physical feature.
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Rather, the people were depicted engaging in various activities in which one would have
to infer the emotional outcome. For instance, within the happy set/category, images might
depict someone opening a gift, eating chocolate or ice-cream, receiving a hug while
smiling, buying a puppy etc. Thus, the images within a category are heterogeneous in
terms of their features but the individuals depicted nonetheless share the same emotion by
virtue of the activity engaged in or the behavior directed towards them. For the same
emotion trials, each emotion matched with itself were utilized three times as the sample
(e.g. happy/happy, sad/sad, angry/angry and surprise/surprise pairings), while the correct
match were pairs of images that depict the same emotions, only these emotions would not
be the same emotion that was depicted in the sample. For example, if the sample depicted
two images of people who were happy, the correct match showed two images of people
who were either both sad, both angry or both fearful. Therefore each same composite
image pair was used once as a correct match for each of the other emotion composite
pairs and three times as an incorrect match on the different trials, so that there were nine
same composite image pairs for each of the four emotions, for 36 total same emotion
composite images. In this way, because each same/same emotion pairing is presented
nine times throughout each session, but we wished to use different images each time this
emotion is presented, nine different images representing this emotion category paired
with itself are necessary.
In addition, there are six composite pairs of each of the six different emotion
pairings; sad/happy, sad/angry, sad/fearful, happy/angry, angry/fearful, happy/fearful,
creating 36 composite different pairings total. Thus, in all, there were 72 total composite
images used in this task. Each of the different composite pairings were used twice as a
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sample, twice as a correct stimulus, and twice as an incorrect stimulus during a session. A
different image was used each time, thus necessitating the use of six different images
representing each possible “different” pairing. If sad/angry is the sample then a correct
stimulus must also depict two emotions that do not match, such as fearful/happy. On half
of the different trials, one of the emotions in the correct stimulus matched one of the
emotions from the sample. On the other half of different trials, neither emotion in the
correct stimulus matched the emotions depicted in the sample. The incorrect stimulus
used the „same‟ emotion composite images described above. Again, on half the trials, that
emotion was the same as one of the emotions depicted in the sample. On the other half of
trials that emotion was not the same as either one of the emotions depicted in the sample.
Physical Reasoning
The physical reasoning task also involved the match-to-sample paradigm
described above, following the same procedure as described for the social reasoning task,
and the same counterbalancing of stimuli as described, but using different stimuli. In this
task, the images depicted cooking, sports, art, and school activities rather than emotions,
such that the child was required to reason about the physical relationship between the
people depicted in the stimuli rather than the emotions that they are feeling. For half of
the trials (twelve trials), the correct matches were similar activities. For example, a
sample stimulus depicted two different images of people experiencing the same activity
(e.g., both are cooking). The correct match was the image that shows two different people
sharing the same activity, but a different activity than that depicted in the sample (for
example both are engaging in sports). Thus the analogical relationship between the
images is one of sameness or same physical activity between the two people depicted but
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the exact physical activity between the sample and the correct comparison image is not
the same. On the other half of trials the sample stimulus depicted two different images of
people experiencing different activities, so the correct match was the image showing two
different people experiencing different activities (but activities that are either the same or
different from the sample image). Here, the analogical relationship between the two
images is one of difference (two different physical activities).
The images that were used in this study depicted combinations of four different
physical activities such as sports, cooking, school, and art activities by using 72
composite image pairs. For the same physical activity trials, each physical activity
matched with itself was utilized three times as the sample (e.g., cooking/cooking,
sports/sports, school/school, and art/art pairings), while the correct match were pairs of
images that depict the same physical activity, but these activities were the same activity
that was depicted in the sample. For example, if the sample depicts two images of people
who are engaging in sports, the correct match showed two images of people who are
either both cooking, both engaging in some of art activity, or both engaging in a schoolrelated activity. Therefore each same composite image pair were used once as a correct
match for each of the other physical activity composite pairs and three times as an
incorrect match on the different trials, so that there was nine same composite image pairs
for each of the four physical activities, for 36 total same physical activity composite
images. In this way, because each same/same activity pairing is presented nine times
throughout each session, we wished to use different images each time this activity was
presented. Thus, nine different images representing this activity category paired with
itself was necessary.
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In addition, there were six composite pairs of each of the six different physical
activity pairings; cooking/art, cooking/school, cooking/sports, art/school, school/sports,
art/sports, creating 36 composite different pairings total. Thus, in all, there were 72 total
composite images used in this task. Each of the different composite pairings was used
twice as a sample, twice as a correct stimulus, and twice as an incorrect stimulus during a
session. A different image was used each time, thus it necessitated the use of six different
images representing each possible “different” pairing. If sports/cooking is the sample
then a correct stimulus must also depict two activities that do not match such as
school/art. On half the different trials, one of the activities in the correct stimulus did not
match one of the activities from the sample. On the other half of different trials, neither
physical activity in the correct stimulus matched the physical activity depicted in the
sample. The incorrect stimulus used the same physical activity composite images
described above. Again, on half the trials, that physical activity was the same as one of
the physical activity depicted in the sample. On the other half of trials that physical
activity was not the same as one of the physical activities depicted in the sample.
As with the social reasoning task, it is important to note that within the categories,
the images used were not homogenous on any particular feature or object. For instance,
within the activity of cooking, images could include people cutting up fruit, rolling
dough, stirring pasta, stir frying meat, barbecuing etc. None of the images would be of
exactly the same activity, but all would belong to the same general category, such that the
child would have to be reasoning about an abstract category and not a single perceptual
or physical feature contained within the images.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The means and standard deviations of each construct are presented in Table 1. As
shown in the table, the mean for attachment was 3.17. Scores on this scale can range from
one to four, so this mean of 3.17 suggests that most of the participants were reporting
high levels of attachment. Additionally, the standard deviation was very low at .54. The
scores on this measure ranged from 1.53 to 4.00. The low standard deviation could be a
potential issue due to the restricted range of this variable, so it is possible that attachment
may not associate with any of the other variables. Additionally, the skewness of this
variable was pretty high at -1.20. This, again, suggests that most of the children were
scoring high on this variable. Thus, to best deal with the issue of negative skew, we
transformed this variable by using the square root and log. Transforming attachment
using the log made no difference over transforming it using the square root, so we used
only the square root of all attachment scores in all analyses reported below.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Constructs
Variables

M

SD
.

Attachment

3.17

54

Verbal Reasoning

101.18

13.94

Social Reasoning

68.22

21.13

Physical Reasoning

76.24

17.13

The mean for verbal reasoning was 101.18, while the standard deviation was
13.94. In a standardization sample of 2,200 who ranged in age from six to 16, the mean
for this scale was a 100 (Weschler, 1991). Thus, our participants seem to be comparable
to the standardization sample. The standard deviation was also high at 13.94, which
suggests that we have a range of scores on this variable. The standard deviation of our
participants was comparable to the standard deviation of the standardization sample,
which was 15.
The mean percentage correct for our participants on the social reasoning task was
68.22, while the standard deviation was 21.13. The mean percentage correct for the
physical reasoning task was 76.24 correct, while the standard deviation was 17.13. The
highest percentage that can be obtained is 100%, so our participants seemed to score
relatively high on these measures, although the variance suggests that we obtained a wide
range of scores for each type of reasoning task. Both of the social and physical reasoning
tasks have not been used before, so there is no normative sample to compare these results
to.
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The intercorrelations among all of the variables are presented in Table 2. Note
that attachment has been transformed using the square root. As Table 2 indicates, there is
a significant positive relationship between social and physical reasoning (r = .55, p <
.01). The relationship between verbal reasoning and social reasoning approached
significance (r = .23, p = .06). Interestingly, attachment was not correlated significantly
with verbal reasoning, nor was it related to social and physical reasoning.

Table 2
Bivariate Correlations among Attachment (Transformed), Language, Social and Physical
Reasoning
Variables

1

2

3

4

Attachment

-

.02

.11

.13

-

.23

.19

-

.55**

Language
Social Reasoning
Physical Reasoning

-

Hypothesis Testing
The proposed model is depicted in Figure 1 below.. Before any analysis was done,
the 15 items from the Security Scale were randomly assigned into three parcels with five
questions within each of the parcels. Additionally, three subscales (Similarities,
Vocabulary, and Comprehension) from the Verbal Comprehension Index were used as
indicators of verbal reasoning. Thus, there were two latent variables and three observed
variables.
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e2
e3

e1

Vocabulary

Similarities

.78

Comprehension

.81

.72

verbal
reasoning

E11

e9

.00
.23

e7

SOCIAL

-.15

attachment

-.10
.22

.83

PHYSICAL

.01 -.10

.97

.52

e8

.77
-.15

PARCEL1

PARCEL2 PARCEL3

e4

e5

gender

-.02

E10

e6

Figure 1. The Proposed Model that was Tested.

Using AMOS 5 and the maximum likelihood method, the first step is to ensure
that the measurement model fits the data well. The test of this theoretical model revealed
interpretable parameter estimates and adequate fit indices: χ² (8, N = 67) = 7.29, p = .50;
CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00; RMSEA = .00. Upon examination of the modification indices
and standardized residuals, there seemed to be no justification for making model
modifications.
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The next step is to determine if the structural model depicted in Figure 1 is a good
fit for the data. For this model, the latent variable attachment is thought to influence
verbal reasoning, which should, in turn, influence social and physical reasoning (two
more observed variables). The chi square and fit indices for this model are as follows: χ²
(17, N = 67) = 35.09, p = .00; CFI = .91 ; TLI = .86; RMSEA = .13. Additionally, the
path from verbal reasoning to social reasoning was significant as indicated by a factor
loading of .28, p < .05. The path from verbal reasoning to physical reasoning approached
significance as indicated by a factor loading of .26, p = .06. Interestingly, attachment was
not related to any of the other variables.
Upon examination of the modification indices, it was found that there may be
some justification for making model modifications. For instance, the modification index
was 17.57 for the covariance between the physical and social reasoning error terms.
Because these two types of tasks are both match-to-sample analogical reasoning tasks, it
would make sense to correlate the error terms. The chi square and fit indices for this new
model with the error terms correlated are as follows: χ² (16, N = 67) = 14.878, p = .53;
CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00; RMSEA = .00. The chi square difference test was used to
compare these nested models (the original model and this new model) for significant
changes in the chi square statistic. For a change in one degree of freedom (this new
model lost one degree of freedom), the critical value for the chi-square distribution is
3.84. This model‟s chi-square did decrease significantly more than this value, so the new
model would be considered a better fit than the original model. This model would also be
accepted over the original model because it makes sense to correlate the error terms for
physical and social reasoning, since they are similar sorts of tasks.
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Since there were some model modifications that were done, it makes sense to also
reexamine the significance of the relationships among the variables in the model. The
path from verbal reasoning to social reasoning was close to significant as indicated by a
factor loading of .25, p = .06. The path from verbal reasoning to physical reasoning was
not close to significance as evident by a factor loading of .22, p = .11. Below, Table 3
depicts the standardized and unstandardized betas, along with the standard errors for
these regressions.
As a last look at this structural equation model, gender was added as a variable to
determine if it was associated with any of other variables. The chi square and fit statistics
are as follows: χ² (20, N = 67) = 17.14, p = .64; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.02; RMSEA = .00.
Table 3
Bivariate Regression for Verbal Reasoning Predicting Social and Physical Reasoning
B

SE B

β

Social Reasoning

2.32

1.33

.23

Physical Reasoning

1.73

1.10

.22

When examining the regression paths, gender was not significantly related to any of the
other variables in the model. Overall, gender did not have much of an effect on the fit of
the model as most of the fit indices are the same, and it also does not seem to be related
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to any of the other variables. Thus, the previous structural equation model should be
accepted over this one.
The last hypothesis that we tested was whether or not there were significant
differences in performance on the social and physical reasoning tasks. There was a
significant difference in performance as indicated by a two-tailed t-test, t (66) = 3.56, p <
.001, although this was not in the expected direction given that the participants on
average performed better on the physical reasoning than on the social reasoning task. In
Table 1, the mean for performance on the physical reasoning task was 76.24, while the
mean for the social reasoning task was 68.22.
In addition to examining percentage correct, we also examined children‟s rate of
responding as an additional measure of performance. A two-way repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted in order to assess whether there were significant differences in
reaction time on the social versus physical reasoning tasks, as a function of whether the
participant responded correctly or incorrectly on the trial. There was a significant
interaction between the type of task and correctness of response, F (1, 66) = 5.51, p = .02.
As can be seen in Figure 2 depicted below, there were significant differences in reaction
time for correct and incorrect responses only on physical reasoning tasks, F (1,66) = 9.80,
p < .01. On physical tasks, participants responded more slowly when incorrect (M =
14802.85 ms, SD = 1783.37), than when correct (M = 9983.88 ms, SD = 980.25). As an
explanation for this result, it may be that the participants responded more quickly when
they were incorrect on the social trials because they were paying more attention to
absolute salient features that matched between the sample and the incorrect comparison,
rather than attending to the relation between the images in each composite stimulus. For

66

example, if there was a happy face in the sample stimulus, they may have been drawn to
the incorrect option thatt also depicted a happy face, and quickly responded that option.
On the other hand, the stimuli used on the physical trials may not have contained the
same kind of physical features that would have been common between images in sample
and comparision images, so participants may have had to attend more slowly, in
particular when they had difficulty ascertaining the correct response.

Figure 2. Average Reaction Time in Milliseconds on Correct and Incorrect Responses
within the Social and Physical Reasoning Tasks
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to test whether or not verbal reasoning mediated the
relationships among attachment and two types of reasoning, social and physical
reasoning. Several relationships were tested. The first relationship tested was among
attachment and social reasoning with language as a mediator of this relationship. The
second relationship that we tested was among attachment and physical reasoning with
language as a mediator. Last of all, we determined if there were any significant
differences in performance among the social and physical reasoning tasks.
In contrast to our hypotheses, attachment was not related to any other variable in
our model. We predicted that higher levels of attachment security would be associated
with verbal reasoning and/or related to the physical and social reasoning tasks. However,
the lack of significant findings could be due to the fact that the security scale was
negatively skewed. In other words, most of the participants scored high on this scale, so
there was not a lot of variance in the scores. This is a potential limitation to our study
because the low variance in this scale could have prevented the possibility of any
significant findings. Thus, it is hard to draw any firm conclusions about the contribution
of attachment to any of the other variables. Because our sample did not include children
who scored low on our measure of attachment, it means that ultimately we were not able
to test the relationship between attachment security and the development of social and
physical reasoning, because there was no variance in attachment. Put another way, we
could not ultimately compare the performance of children with lower levels of attachment
to those with higher levels of attachment on our dependent measures because we obtained
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scores from children from only one end of the distribution. Therefore, we cannot really
say where the differences might lie based on our data. If all of the children from our
sample were at ceiling on this measure, we probably did not have the power to detect any
differences. Future studies that obtain a more diverse sample that varies in attachment
may be more likely to reveal significant patterns between these complex variables.
However, it should be noted that our results were not extremely discrepant from
other published results using the same measure of attachment. First, a study by Diener,
Isabella, Behunin, and Wong (2007) investigated the association among attachment, child
gender, grade, and competence. Their mean for security of attachment with mothers for
girls was 3.37, while the standard deviation was 0.43. Similarly, the mean for security of
attachment with mothers for boys was 3.29 and the standard deviation was .45. In
contrast to our own study, attachment was related to their variables of interest as
attachment was significantly correlated to self-perceived peer competence and selfperceived academic competence. Kerns, Aspelmeier, Gentzler, and Grabill (2001)
investigated the relationship among attachment and monitoring in middle childhood. For
their third grade participants, the mean for security to mother was 3.43, while the
standard deviation was 0.36. For their sixth grade participants, the mean for security to
mother was 3.29 and the standard deviation was 0.42. The results revealed that
monitoring did relate to attachment, but only in the 6th grade. Thus, it seems that these
two studies show similar descriptive statistics such as mean and standard deviation, but
they obtained a relationship between attachment and one or more of their variables of
interest nonetheless. In these studies, attachment was being investigated in relation to
variables related to aspects of self-concept/self-esteem so it is possible that more subtle
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differences in attachment security are enough to drive an effect, whereas in studies, such
as ours, investigating links between attachment and the development of cognitive
capacities larger differences are necessary in order for attachment to exert a significant
effect on development.
Another explanation for why attachment may not be related to any of our other
variables is that there is a sensitive period in which the effects of attachment exert their
influence on development, and that those facilitative effects have already been exhausted
on capacities that have reached their full potential before children reached the age of 11
or middle childhood. For instance, theory of mind develops around the ages of three to
five, so attachment may have more or less facilitated performance on theory of mind
tasks at that age range rather than the age range in the present study. Perhaps there are no
more facilitative effects of a secure childhood beyond the initial development of theory of
mind, joint attention and so on, so that benefits are not seen beyond early childhood, at
least within the range of purely cognitive abilities being targeted in the current study.
In contrast to the Security Scale, we obtained greater variance on the measure of
verbal reasoning, which was indicated by a standard deviation of 13.94. Therefore, we
were able to more adequately assess the contribution of verbal reasoning independently
of attachment. Verbal reasoning seemed to have a stronger influence on social reasoning,
given that this relationship was close to statistical significance. This makes sense because
of the relationship shown between language and theory of mind and other aspects of
social reasoning. Although none of the paths from verbal reasoning to physical reasoning
and social reasoning were significant, the path from verbal reasoning to social reasoning
was closer to significance than the one from verbal reasoning to physical reasoning. It
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may suggest the possibility of more of an influence of verbal reasoning on social
reasoning performance.
Additionally, these results are consistent with the literature that focuses on the
relationship between language and analogical reasoning or cognition more generally. For
instance, Baldwin and Saylor (1995) also advocated the importance of language to
analogical reasoning because it promotes abstraction and highlights any non-obvious
commonalities among objects and events. Evidence for this may come from a study by
Kotovosky and Gentner (1996) who tested a key claim of the knowledge-change view
that learning about domain relations should increase identification of relational similarity
among objects or stimuli; thus, children are better able to complete an analogical
reasoning task when they have appropriate knowledge of a particular domain. They did,
in fact, find that relational labels did increase the salience of the common relational
structure of the stimuli. Generally, language may allow an individual to think more
abstractly, which in turn, can help them solve analogical reasoning problems.
In contrast to our last hypothesis, on average, the participants performed better on
the physical reasoning task rather than the social reasoning task. When considering the
social reasoning task, it may be more difficult to reason about mental states because you
have to first examine the physical characteristics readily apparent in the stimuli and then,
from that, infer the underlying trait or emotion being depicted. However, with the
physical reasoning task, the participant had to examine only the physical characteristics
and infer the physical task; there is not any inference to be made about some invisible
abstract and unobservable underlying trait. Although we attempted to equate the
difficulty of both tasks so that neither task provided identical physical features between
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categories, there may have been an additional level of inference in the social task for that
reason. In the physical matching tasks, the sports category, for example, would have
included images of people engaging in soccer, football, baseball, gymnastics, so that the
activities were all different and involved different actions and objects. Thus, physically
the images appeared quite distinct and the participant still needed to infer what the
general category was and what the images had in common – but all of the information
was readily available within those physical characteristics. Within the social matching
tasks, such as the emotion category of happiness, some people may have been laughing,
some smiling with mouths open, some with mouths closed, always in different scenarios,
so it may have been more difficult to determine what was binding them together into the
same category without inferring underlying dispositions – which requires an additional
level of analysis. Of course, it is precisely such a difference that leads many to presume
that humans differ from other species on the capacity to make such inferences (Penn &
Povinelli, 2007; Povinelli & Vonk, 2004).
It is interesting to note that despite the fact that the participants performed better
on the physical reasoning task, their reaction time was a lot slower on these tasks when
they were incorrect; whereas, this was not the case on the social reasoning tasks. As
noted earlier, they may be more distracted by absolute matches, rather than attending to
the relation between stimuli on social trials, and thus choose quickly on both trials when
they are correct and incorrect on social trials. For instance, on “happy/happy same” trials,
they may be drawn to smiling faces that might appear in an incorrect happy/sad different
comparison option, for example. Whereas, on physical trials, there may be less salient
features that match between categories, thus forcing participants to attend to the relations,
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which would slow them down the most on trials where they might ultimately be
incorrect.
If our analogical reasoning tasks had been more reliant on verbal instructions, as
in more traditional theory of mind tasks, like false belief tasks, it may have led to the
predicted differences in our reasoning tasks. That is, we may have found better
performance on the social reasoning tasks than the physical reasoning tasks. Past studies
(Zaitchik, 1990) that have investigated differences between social tasks (such as theory of
mind tasks) and more general cognitive tasks (false photograph tasks) have found that
typically developed children performed slightly better on the theory of mind tasks than
the false photograph tasks, although this difference was nonsignificant. Thus, it may be
that more verbally dependent social tasks allow verbally skilled children to use their
verbal skills to bolster performance in a way they could not on our primarly nonverbal
social task.
Future Directions
One of the major limitations in our study was the fact that the variance on the
Security Scale was quite low. Most of the participants scored high on this scale, so it was
difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the relationship that attachment had with any
of the other variables. An increase in sample size may increase the variance associated
with scores on the Security Scale. Hopefully, by increasing sample size, there would be a
greater range of attachment styles. It is possible that we may not have had a sample that
was diverse in secure and insecure attachment because most of our participants came
from a small, family oriented town with a fairly high SES.
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Future studies could replicate the same study with a larger sample size, so
hopefully there would be more variance in scores on the Security Scale. If this is the case,
there may be a better potential to find a significant relationship among attachment and the
other variables in this study. Furthermore, if attachment is found to be related to the other
variables, language could be a mediator of those relationships. For instance, as we
predicted within this study, language could be a mediator among the relationships of
attachment and social/physical reasoning. In this study, language was found to be a
predictor of social reasoning, so it could still potentially mediate the relationship among
attachment and social reasoning if there is enough variance in the scores from the
Security Scale.
Another weakness was the fact that our social reasoning task may assess theory of
mind reasoning on only a cursory level. In our study, we used an analogical reasoning
task to assess social reasoning. Specifically, it was a match-to-sample task, where the
participants matched a sample stimulus to its correct comparison image. Emotions were
used as stimuli within this task. In this task, we may not know for sure whether or not the
children are truly reasoning about feelings and emotions. It may be possible that they
have learned to treat a person in a particular way depending on the behaviors that another
person exhibited. For example, if someone is sitting with their head down and not
smiling, we may have learned to assume that this person behaves in a particular manner
that differs from how one behaves when exhibiting behaviors consistent with happiness
or anger, without ever reasoning about their underlying emotions. Thus it is possible to
reason about the outward manifestations of underlying emotions and not the emotions
themselves, and still do well in our task. However, it is assumed that children who are
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attuned to the emotions of others, are also better at reading the outward signs of those
emotions. Therefore, even though we may be assessing theory of mind on only a cursory
level, those with better theory of mind abilities should still do better on our task than
those who do not. So, while our task may be an indirect measure of theory of mind, it
should correlate with other more direct measures and is still considered a social reasoning
task.
Typically, theory of mind is assessed using false-belief tasks (Wimmer & Perner,
1983). In those tasks, participants are usually shown something being hidden while in the
presence of a character. Then, the character leaves, and the object is moved to another
location. The character comes back, and the participant is asked where he or she will look
for the object. So, if the participant has theory of mind, they should understand that the
character will look for the object in the place that they left it initially. False-belief tasks
assess theory of mind ability more conclusively because they assess whether an
individual is able to represent that another person is holding a thought, feeling, or belief
that is different from his or her own. Thus, they truly show that an individual is not
reasoning about just his or her own thoughts and feelings and that this individual is
capable of representing dual beliefs. Future studies could use two analogous tasks, one
that comes closer to assessing the concept of theory of mind and another that assesses
physical reasoning or cognition more generally.
However, a strength of the present study was the choice of using two analogous
tasks where one assessed social reasoning and the other assessed physical reasoning.
Additionally, these types of tasks have not been used before to assess these different
types of reasoning. One of the reasons the tasks were analogous for this study was to
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make them comparable and not confound the contribution of language to the two
different tasks. These tasks were meant to be more nonverbal in nature, so they can be
used with comparative and clinical populations, along with younger children.
Furthermore, because of our interest in assessing the impact of attachment and language
on broader cognitive abilities, such as analogical reasoning, we needed to design a task
that required children to reason about the relations between objects in both social and
non-social domains. Our task was constructed to achieve this goal.
One strength of this study may be that our match-to-sample task did not require
the use of language in that the children were not asked a lot of questions that they had to
answer. They were initially given instructions with few prompts after that. This allows
the current methodology, including all of the variables, to be conducted with other
populations, such as younger children and children with certain disorders, such as
children with autism and other language-delayed populations. As discussed, research has
found that children with ASD do not do well on false-belief tasks, which may be due to
the language comprehension that is required. Children with autism generally have some
language impairments (Jarrold et al., 1999). Thus, it is possible that children with autism
may be able to perform at higher levels on our match-to-sample tasks, which assess social
reasoning skills, in contrast to their performance on traditional false belief tests. In the
current study, it was found that verbal reasoning may affect performance more on the
social reasoning tasks, so it may be that better language skills are required when it comes
to social reasoning. Within the social reasoning tasks that we used, it requires the
inference of an underlying emotion rather than just how emotions are manifested in the
expressions of the individuals, which would be a whole lot more observable and less
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abstract. Thus, when making inferences about some underlying emotion, language is
needed in order to think about those things. This may be why language is required for
social reasoning tasks rather that physical reasoning tasks, where you can easily oberve
activities and there‟s no inference about some underlying trait. Furthermore, our MTS
tests can also be presented to non-human populations to extend the study of comparative
as well as developmental psychology, as comparisons between social and physical
reasoning are of interest with other species as well. In fact, we are currently testing an
adult male chimpanzee with the pilot version of our procedure and hope to extend those
tests to other species as well.
Conclusion
First of all, the current study investigated the relationship among attachment and
analogical reasoning, which has not been studied before. It was found that attachment did
not relate to any of the other variables, but this may be due to the low variance of scores
on the Security Scale. It is interesting to note that language was found to be a stronger
predictor of social reasoning, but less so for physical reasoning. This may suggest that
language is more important to the development of social reasoning rather than physical
reasoning.

77

APPENDIX A
WHAT I AM LIKE WITH MY MOTHER
Instructions to Child:
This questionnaire asks about what you are like with your mother – like how you act and feel
around her. Before we get to those questions, let‟s try a practice question. Each question talks
about two kinds of kids, and we want to know which kids are most like you. Decide first
whether you are more like the kids on the left side or more like the kids on the right side, then
decide whether that is sort of true for you, or really true for you, and circle that phrase. For
each question you will only circle one answer.

Practice Question:

Some kids would rather play
sports in their spare time.

1.

BUT

Other kids would rather watch
T.V.

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids find it easy to trust
their mom

Other kids are not sure if they can
trust their mom.
BUT

2.

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids feel like their mom
butts in a lot when they are trying
to do things

Really true

Sort of

Other kids are feel like their mom
lets them do things on their own
BUT

Sort of

Really true
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for me

3.

true for me

true for me

for me

Other kids think it‟s hard to count
on their mom

Some kids find it easy to count on
their mom for help
BUT

4.

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids think their mom
spends enough time with them

Other kids think their mom does
not spend enough time with them.
BUT

5.

6.

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids do not really like
telling their mom what they are
thinking or feeling

BUT

Other kids do like telling their
mom what they are thinking or
feeling.

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids do not really need their
mom for much

Other kids need their mom for a
lot of things.
BUT

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true
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for me

7.

true for me

true for me

Some kids wish they were closer
to their mom

for me

Other kids are happy with how
close they are to their mom .
BUT

8.

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids worry that their mom
does not really love them

Other kids are really sure that their
mom loves them.
BUT

9.

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids feel like their mom
really understands them

Other kids feel like their mom
does not really understand them.
BUT

10
.

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids are really sure their
mom would not leave them

Other kids sometimes wonder if
their mom might leave them
BUT
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11
.

12
.

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids worry that their mom
might not be there when they
need her

Other kids are sure their mom will
be there when they need her.
BUT

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids think their mom does
not listen to them

Other kids do think their mom
listens to them.
BUT

13
.

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids go to their mom when
they are upset

Other kids do not go to their mom
when they are upset
BUT

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me
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14
.

15
.

Some kids wish their mom would
help them more with their
problems

Other kids think their mom helps
them enough.
BUT

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me

Some kids feel better when their
mom is around

Other kids do not feel better when
their mom is around.
BUT

Really true

Sort of

Sort of

Really true

for me

true for me

true for me

for me
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APPENDIX B
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FORM
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